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COMMENTS
PRESIDENTIAL POWER OF REMOVAL
In the case of Meyers v. United States,' the United States
Supreme Court settled in part a question which has remained
unsettled since the establishment of our federal government,
the question of the extent of the Presidential power of removal.
When this decision was first rendered it was haled as one of
far-reaching importance, settling all questions as to Presiden-
tial power of removal and perhaps laying the foundation for
executive tyranny, but more sober second thought has shown
that it is not of so much importance, has left unsettled more
questions than it settled and probably will not be the cause of
executive tyranny.
The only question really settled by this decision was that
the President can remove without the consent of the Senate
an executive officer appointed by him with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, in spite of an act of Congress to the con-
trary. 2 The decision was probably the one expected by the
legal profession, but now that the legal profession has it, the
profession is probably in more doubt as to its correctness than
before it was rendered. The decision was a six to three deci-
sion. Chief Justice Taft gave the opinion for the court. Jus-
tices McReynolds, Brandeis and Holmes dissented. The argu-
ment of the court apparently was: (1) that the power of re-
moval is primarily an executive power and therefore by impli-
cation was granted to the President when he was vested with
executive power;3 and (2) that the power of removal is an
incident of the power of appointment and therefore again by
implication was granted to the President when he was expressly
granted the power of appointment;4 (3) that the power of
Congress to vest the appointment of inferior officers "in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of De-
partments"5 is an exception to the general grant of power to
the President; and (4) that the right of removal is essential
to a proper exercise of the executive function of executing the
laws.6
1 (1926), 47 Sup. Ct. 21.
2 19 Stat. 76, 80. (An act relating to postmasters of the first, second
and third classes.)
3 Art. II, Sec. 1 (1).
4 Art. H, Sec. 2 (2).
r Art. II, Sec. 2 (2).
6 Art. II, Sec. 3.
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The Constitution says nothing about the Presidential power
of removal. The whole doctrine is a work of implication upon
the part of the Supreme Court. The court could have held that
the President has no power of removal, or that he has such
power but subject to Congressional control, or that he has an
uncontrollable power. It decided to hold that he has an un-
controllable power at least where appointment has been with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Was the court right in
taking this position?
How stood authority? The weight of authority seems to
have been against the position of the court. The court laid
great stress upon legislative precedent, but the only precedent
it could find was that of the Congressional debate of 17897 and
Chief Justice Taft devoted one-half of his opinion to this de-
bate, but as Justice Brandeis pointed out this debate was par-
ticipated in only by a few and the vote was a vote by those
who wanted to confer power upon the President rather than to
acknowledge his power.T Later Congressional precedents were
all against the position that the President's power is uncon-
trollable. 9 Justice Brandeis also showed how executive prec-
edents were in accord with legislative precedentslo The first
judicial precedent was the case of Marbury v. Madison." In
this case Chief Justice Marshall took the position that "as the
law creating the office gave the officer the right to hold for
five years, independent of the executive, the appointment was
not revocable." Chief Justice Taft called this an obiter dictum,
but it would seem that Justice Brandeis was right when he
said that it was "the basis of decision that the President acting
alone is powerless to remove an inferior civil officer appointed
for a fixed term with the consent of the Senate," for without
this premise there would have been no excuse for the discus-
sion of judicial review of legislation. Ex parte Hennen'2 upon
which the court relied, was an ambiguous decision, but the bet-
ter view of it seems to be that the court as then constituted
thought the President had the exclusive power of removal un-
7 1 Stat. 23, c. 4.
8 See opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis. However, up to 1830, the action
of Congress in 1789 was generally regarded as a legislative declaration in
favor of the Presidential power of removal.
9 Ibid. 12 Stat. 666; 14 Stat. 430; 17 Stat. 284, 19 Stat. 80.
10 Ibid. While Presidents Grant, Cleveland, Wilson and Coolidge have
all asserted their uncontrollable power of removal, every President since
1861, with the exception of President Garfield, has approved one or more
statutes restricting the exercise of his power.
11 (1801), 1 Cranch 137, 162.
12 (1839), 13 Pet. 230, 259; 1 Kent. Commentaries (12th ed.) 309.
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less limited by the Constitution or statute. United States v.
Perkins13 held that Congress might limit and restrict the power
of removal as it deemed best when it vested the appointment
of inferior officers in the heads of departments. Parsons v.
United States, 4 relied upon by the majority, seemed to go no
farther than to say that if Congress did not provide for the
consent of the Senate to removal a mere clause fixing the tenure
of office would not deprive the President of the exclusive power
of removal. The same thing can be said of Shurtleff v. United
States.'5 Hence from the standpoint of authority-legislative,
executive and judicial-the decision in Meyers v. United States
is without explicit support.
How stands the court's logic? Its argument that the power
of removal is an executive power seems adequately met by Jus-
tice Holmes' remark that it is a "spider's web." It is no more
executive than it is legislative. The power of removal, like
that of appointment, comes from Congress. Justice McReyn-
olds seems right when he said that the power of removal is
executive, but prescribing the conditions of removal is legisla-
tive. If the mere vesting of executive power in the President
gave him all inherent executive powers, why did the Constitu-
tion later enumerate the executive functions of the President?
The majority apparently overdid the doctrine of separation of
powers, which was largely emasculated by the system of checks
of balances set up in the Constitution. If the power of removal
is an incident of the power of appointment, why by inference
should not the Senate participate in the removal when it par-
ticipates in the appointment? Is this point met by the state-
ment that "the power of removal is an incident of the power
of removal, not to the power of advising and consenting?"
Again, does the duty to enforce all the laws, give the President a
right to violate one? The logic seems lame, and the arguments
inadequate.
How stands the court's sociology? Perhaps the result is
not a bad result. The decision may work well in practice. It
would seem that it should promote executive efficiency, and that
any danger of executive tyranny can be safeguarded by the
power of impeachment, by the power of Congress to vest the
appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments,
and by the power of the electorate at the polls. It may be that
Congress should be confronted with the alternative of giving
I3 (1886), 116 U. S. 483.
14 (1897), 167 U. S. 324.
15 (1903), 189 U. S. 311.
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up either the power of consenting to the Presidential removal
or the power of the Senate to advise and consent to Presiden-
tial appointment.
There are many questions unsettled by the decision of Meyers
v. United States.16 The Supreme Court has not told us whether
the power to remove is based upon constitutional authority, or
attributable to the power to appoint. If the former, would the
President not still have the power of removal though the ap-
pointment of inferior officers was taken from him pursuant to
the Constitution? If the power of removal is an executive
power, is it to be confined to the removal of executives, or to
be allowed to include quasi-legislative officers like the members
of the Federal Trade Commission and of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission? Are territorial officers executive or legis-
lative officers? Who are inferior officers? Are they all those
officers not named in the Constitution? Suppose Congress
should vest the appointment of inferior officers "in the Presl-
dent alone," would the President have an uncontrollable or a
controllable power of removal? For an answer to these ques-
tions we shall have to wait for future decisions.
HUGH EVANDER WILLIS.
Indiana University School of Law.
16 Supra.
